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# Central Intelligence Bulletin

State Department review completed

**Top Secret**

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26 November 1973



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Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A025700040001-2

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**GREECE:** Elements of the Greek Army ousted President Papadopoulos in a bloodless coup early yesterday morning. The takeover, reportedly engineered by Chief of Military Police Dimitrios Ioannidis, installed First Army Commander Phaidon Gizikis as President and former minister Adamantios Androutsopoulos as Prime Minister. The country is calm.

Troops allied with the new junta seized key government buildings before dawn. They encountered almost no military or popular resistance, but took the precautions of replacing several armed forces and police commanders and of imposing a full curfew in Athens and Salonika. Reflecting confidence that it was firmly in control, the new government announced late last night that the curfew would be lifted and that all public utilities and transport, business, and educational facilities--excepting universities--would "function normally" today.

Papadopoulos is reported by the press to be alive and unharmed but under house arrest at his seaside villa 25 miles south of Athens.

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Former prime minister Markezinis is under house arrest, according to press reports.

Ioannidis reportedly is pro-American and pro-NATO. He is also a hard-line, puritanical nationalist who for some time has been irritated at what he saw as Papadopoulos' policies of megalomania and self-aggrandizement. His disenchantment apparently dates back at least to 1971, when he was a leading member of a group formed to oust the president. Though outmaneuvered at the time, the group remained intact.

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C President Gizikis reportedly is also pro-American and pro-NATO. He was Ioannidis' candidate for the position of army commander when reassignments were made this past summer, but was passed over by Papadopoulos. Prime Minister Androutsopoulos practiced law in the United States before returning to Greece to enter politics in the mid-1960s. He served under Papadopoulos as minister of finance and minister of interior before resigning--ostensibly for reasons of health--in May 1973.

The 17-man cabinet appointed yesterday afternoon is composed of relatively obscure individuals. All are civilians, although at least two have military backgrounds. Little is known about their political orientation.

The new leaders apparently were prompted to mount their coup at this time by unhappiness with the effects of Papadopoulos' efforts to return Greece to a limited parliamentary system, by what they considered deviation from the spartan virtues praised by Papadopoulos at the time of his 1967 takeover, and by dissatisfaction with the government's handling of last week's disturbances. An unsigned proclamation issued "in the name of the armed forces" charged yesterday that the Papadopoulos government, instead of creating suitable preconditions for the nation's return to a parliamentary system on a sound basis and cleansing public life, was leading the country "toward the same situation against which the armed forces rose in 1967." In the most tangible manifestation of this unhappiness, Athens radio announced that the parliamentary elections promised by the Papadopoulos government had been called off.

Despite the apparently uncompromising political outlook of the new leaders, they are taking some steps to marshal popular support. Coup leader Ioannidis, according to press reports, last night summoned Athens publishers to announce the lifting of censorship.

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**ARAB SUMMIT:** The leaders of 15 Arab states today begin two days of meetings designed to forge a common policy for dealing with Israel and the US. Although these consultations may lead to superficial "unity," they will probably be unsatisfying for all concerned. Some Arab leaders are already resentful of President Sadat's efforts to assure that the conclave will be a pro forma gathering to ratify his decision to negotiate with Israel. Furthermore, the absence of key leaders, including Presidents Qadhafi and Bakr and King Husayn, will deprive Sadat of the show of Arab solidarity he had hoped for.

The summit conferees apparently will do little more than rubber-stamp decisions made during the weekend meeting of Arab foreign ministers, whose agenda was reportedly prepared and controlled by the Egyptian delegation. The foreign ministers discussed the extension of the oil embargo to other nations considered supporters of Israel, the possible use of monetary resources as a political weapon, and the Palestinian question.

Egypt is on record as favoring an extension of the oil boycott to South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. It is doubtful, however, that the summit will reach any decision on monetary questions. Moreover, there are indications that the Egyptians want discussion of the Palestinian issue to remain as cursory and uncontroversial as possible. In addition to discussing these issues, the heads of state will probably endorse Arab participation in the forthcoming peace conference.

President Sadat's efforts to assure that the moderate Arab states control the summit have preempted the radicals. Iraq and Libya, expecting that the gathering will approve Sadat's decision to negotiate with Israel, are boycotting the conclave. Algeria, despite its irritation at Sadat's maneuvers, will reportedly not raise controversial, potentially divisive issues.

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C Sadat will not get from the summit all he wants, however. He will be unable to draw out the support of his Arab colleagues with reports of tangible progress in the disengagement negotiations with Israel, and he will fail to unify the Arabs, in part because of continuing disagreements between Jordan and the fedayeen.

King Husayn has refused to attend, primarily because of the Jordan-fedayeen issue. He apparently fears that the Egyptians and other Arab states will bless fedayeen participation in a peace conference and will support the fedayeen's demand for creation of a separate Palestinian state on Jordan's West Bank. He has instead sent a lower level delegation to the summit so that he can avoid a personal showdown with fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat and his supporters on this issue.

Arafat is attending the summit to secure his own position and assure that no other Palestinians, particularly non-fedayeen Palestinians under Jordanian control, are designated to represent Palestinian interests in any future peace negotiations. The summit may well name Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in negotiations, but the fedayeen's own inability to reach agreement on their territorial demands and on the desirability of establishing a government-in-exile will probably result in a summit decision to allow the fedayeen to work out for themselves how to establish an independent Palestinian entity.

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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: Egypt called off yesterday's scheduled meeting with Israeli representatives on the question of disengagement of forces, apparently in protest against what the Egyptians view as Israeli stalling. Another meeting is set for today, however. Tensions remain high on both military fronts, and the Israelis reported a brief exchange of artillery fire on the Egyptian front yesterday.

At meetings on 22, 23, and 24 November, Israeli and Egyptian negotiators discussed a variety of withdrawal proposals without reaching agreement on either the extent of an Israeli pullback or the degree of control Egypt would be permitted to retain on the Suez Canal's east and west banks. The Israeli newspaper Maariv has reported that Israel will evacuate its west bank salient and withdraw to a point six miles east of the canal. This would be done on condition, however, that Egypt remove its military units from the east bank, deploy only "policing" forces, and agree not to introduce heavy weapons into the evacuated area of the west bank. The Israeli requirement that Egypt not occupy either bank of the canal in force has apparently become the major sticking point in the negotiations. The Egyptians have become increasingly frustrated as they have become convinced that this is an Israeli effort to stall.

The Egyptians apparently feel that it is incumbent on Israel to withdraw to the original truce lines without discussion and that, failing this, continued haggling over further withdrawal is merely an effort to delay the necessity for any Israeli movement. Sadat is probably also somewhat disgruntled that he has been able to achieve nothing in the way of tangible progress that he could present to the Arab summit as justification for his decision to negotiate. There has been no indication, however, that the Egyptians intend to terminate the talks.

Jerusalem radio announced yesterday that the Israeli cabinet had decided to accept "in principle" the convening of a peace conference next month in

Geneva to be attended, according to the radio report, by Israel, the three Arab confrontation states, the US, the USSR, and the UN Secretary General. Israel is withholding official acceptance, however, until it receives a formal invitation to the conference. The Israeli press has indicated that the opening will be only pro forma as far as Israel is concerned; substantive negotiations must await the conclusion of Knesset elections on 31 December. The Israeli report of the conference participants omits any mention either of Palestinians or of other UN Security Council members, on whose participation the Arabs may insist.

On the military front, Israeli spokesmen announced yesterday that an artillery exchange had taken place between Egyptian and Israeli forces at the northwestern edge of the Israeli salient on the west bank. The exchange, the Israelis contend, was initiated by the Egyptians and continued for 30 minutes. The Israeli press has portrayed this as an escalation in military incidents, which have "for some time" consisted only of small-arms fire. No further incidents were reported after mid-afternoon yesterday.

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While the Israelis talk publicly about increased Arab preparations for renewed fighting, the Arabs are apparently somewhat concerned that the Israelis themselves may intend some action.

Prospects for effective action by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) have increased in the past few days. The General Assembly's Finance Committee has approved plans for a special assessment of UN members to fund UNEF, which has been hard pressed financially since its establishment. The approved assessment formula will place the major burden of UNEF costs on the developed states, particularly the US, the USSR, France, and the UK. China has announced that it will not contribute.

In other UN action, the Security Council has added Kenya and Senegal to the 11 states already providing troops to UNEF, a move that should bring the force close to its 7,000-man goal. Deployment of the troops will be facilitated by an agreement reached this weekend between Canada and Poland on the organization of their joint logistics unit. Protracted Canadian-Polish negotiations over logistic duties have until now delayed badly needed transportation and other support facilities.

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USSR-FEDAYEEN: Moscow's failure to acknowledge the visit by Yasir Arafat's delegation suggests it is maintaining a cautious attitude toward the fedayeen until Palestinian issues are resolved within the Arab camp.

Arafat reportedly was accompanied on the six-day visit, which ended Saturday, by all of the other principal fedayeen leaders except George Habbash of the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The delegation declined to discuss the substance of its talks or the level at which it was received, although Arafat claimed the dialogue "exceeded our expectations." Soviet media have ignored the visit, and a Middle East specialist in the Foreign Ministry told the US Embassy on 23 November that Arafat had not been in Moscow.

The Soviets probably used Arafat's visit to take soundings on these issues and on the question of Palestinian participation in a Middle East peace conference. In talks with the US, the Soviets have stressed the complexity of the Palestinian problem and have said the USSR would not be in a position to support or propose solutions until after the Arab summit meeting in Algiers.

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ATLANTIC DECLARATIONS: Secretary General Luns is urging that the NATO declaration of Atlantic principles be completed in time for the semiannual NATO ministerial meeting on 10-11 December.

The allies last week accepted the revised French text of the declaration as the basic draft. Most, however, clearly want some changes in it, and there was general consensus that comments or revisions from all members should be presented by 28 November. Belgian Permanent Representative De Staercke forcefully stated that a US contribution is important now if there is to be a collective dialogue of the Fifteen rather than one between the US and the Fourteen. He is concerned that if the US delays, it will end up dealing with the others as an outsider. De Staercke also believes that delays will allow time for other nations to submit amendments to the French draft, and the final text might then be either unacceptable to the French or disappointing to those whose amendments are not accepted.

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YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA: Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu's talks in Belgrade today and tomorrow come at a troubled juncture in bilateral relations and are likely to set the tone for the next Tito-Ceausescu meeting scheduled for the end of the year.

Tito's visit to the USSR two weeks ago will be a key issue. The Romanians cannot be happy with the communiqué Tito signed in Kiev. It described Soviet-Yugoslav relations as based on "trust and confidence" and dropped references to respect for national integrity and party equality that have been standard in Yugoslav and Romanian dealings with Moscow. Bucharest must now be wondering how much support it can expect from Belgrade in future ideological disputes with the Soviets.

Even before the Kiev trip, bilateral relations were badly strained by Yugoslav pressures for Romania to take a more pro-Arab stand in the Middle East crisis. Bad feeling continues to be fed by competition for a prominent role in finding a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem.

Both countries have so far muted public displays of disagreements, and Ceausescu would be reluctant to emphasize Romanian isolation.

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BREZHNEV VISITS INDIA

Soviet party leader Brezhnev begins a five-day visit to India today. Both sides are in substantial agreement on many international issues and some new bilateral accords are likely. The visit will not deflect India from its efforts to broaden its foreign policy options, however, and Brezhnev is probably conscious that he can accomplish more by indirect means than by heavy pressure on India.

Background

Soviet-Indian relations were quite close during the crisis in 1971 over Bangladesh, but a decline set in almost as soon as the fighting stopped. India resented Moscow's efforts to play the peacemaker among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh and its failure fully to coordinate policy toward Bangladesh. Moscow's decision in May 1972 to go ahead with the Soviet-US summit after the US mined North Vietnam's harbors brought home to the Indians the limits of Soviet support for an ally. It also prompted New Delhi's subsequent emphasis on "self-reliance" and its moves to improve relations with Washington and Peking. In addition, nagging problems related to economic and military aid have resurfaced over the past two years. India was not happy with the types, the quantity, and sometimes the price Moscow asked for its economic and military aid. Moscow's trade with the West also raised questions in Indian minds about the USSR's willingness to continue importing Indian goods not exportable to the West.

Soviet Aims

For the Soviets and for Brezhnev personally, the visit is intended to establish the USSR's credentials as a moving force behind Asian detente and to demonstrate that Moscow's pursuit of better relations with the West has not been at the expense of traditional clients. This is Brezhnev's first visit to the Third World in his capacity as party chief, and he is hoping to secure Indian support for his policy of detente with the West and endorsement of

his Asian collective security proposal. He also would like to take back to Moscow more tangible evidence that the USSR's decision to sign a Friendship Treaty with India in August 1971 has concrete value for the USSR. This proof could come in the form of closer Soviet-Indian military coordination or perhaps an Indian commitment to keep Moscow better informed of developments in India's relations with China and the US.

In all of this, however, Brezhnev is likely to be only partially successful. He will be able to profit from the considerable overlap in Soviet and Indian positions on a substantial number of international issues, and he has already earned points by a loan in October of two million tons of grain that is helping India through the final stages of a food crisis. Mrs. Gandhi also welcomes evidence of a major power's continued willingness to provide new economic and military aid to India. The Indians have their own ideas, however, on relations among the Asian states and, more important, on who should have the major voice in determining them. They have an interest, therefore, in avoiding actions that would lead to even the appearance of a more direct role for the Soviets in the area.

#### International Questions

From the Soviet point of view, the main international problem is China. It accounts, in large measure, for Moscow's desire to increase military cooperation with the Indians, to win India's endorsement of the Asian collective security scheme, and to encourage better Indo-Japanese relations and a larger Indian role in Indochina. Moscow is doubtless disappointed that its support for India during the 1971 war did no more than temporarily halt Indian efforts to achieve a rapprochement with China. Early this year, the Soviets published an article in Problems of the Far East, which for the first time supported Indian border claims against China. Though the Indians had been seeking such support for years, there is no evidence they were pressing the issue at that particular time. It seemed that Moscow's objective

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was to remind India of the problem and thus frustrate any developing Sino-Indian rapprochement.

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Aware of Indian sensitivity to being caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, however, Brezhnev will almost certainly take an indirect approach to the China problem. He will encourage India's detente efforts in South Asia and try to elicit India's endorsement of as many Soviet proposals as he can that the Chinese oppose. Compromise language probably can be found on most of these. Though they may relent during the visit, the Indians apparently do not now plan to endorse the Asian collective security idea specifically.

India will doubtless want to get Brezhnev's views on Soviet relations with the US and Soviet-US interaction during the Middle East crisis, but its main international concerns are closer to home. New Delhi may seek a Soviet assessment of the Iranian military buildup in the Persian Gulf. The Indians are interested in Soviet intentions regarding Pakistan and the new government in Afghanistan, and may also probe for Soviet support of efforts by the littoral countries to have the Indian Ocean area declared a "zone of peace." With the possible exception of the "zone of peace" idea, the talks on these questions will not be contentious. Moscow probably will agree that the Iranian military buildup bears watching, and will try to reassure India regarding Pakistan's intentions toward India and Soviet policy toward Pakistan. Both countries seem to be in general agreement that the new republican government in Afghanistan ought to be supported, but neither has encouraged Prime Minister Daoud's efforts to revive the Pushtunistan problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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Bilateral Issues

The Indians may seek to avoid discussion of Moscow's desire for naval facilities at Indian ports--the most sensitive bilateral problem on Brezhnev's agenda. On 20 November, they leaked word that Moscow had formally requested "standing port privileges" for the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet. They also said that India probably would reject the request. There may be more fruitful exchanges on other military items on the agenda.

On economic matters, Brezhnev will be at least partially responsive. For the past several years, India has been repaying Moscow greater sums on old debts than it receives in the way of new aid. India will seek to reverse the negative aid flow. India also wants Soviet assistance in expanding the two Soviet-built steel mills at Bhilai and Bikaro, in coping with its energy crisis, and in establishing a domestic shipbuilding industry.

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The two countries probably will sign a consular convention, some economic agreements that will probably be billed as the USSR's contribution to India's next five-year plan, a commercial shipping accord, and a space recovery agreement. The latter has been under negotiation for two years. Under the terms of the draft agreement, the Soviets will be allowed to send planes and ships to India several times a year to assist in Soviet space ventures. The Soviets may also choose this time to announce the appointment of a new ambassador to India. Moscow has been without an ambassador in New Delhi since last April. Brezhnev has been invited to visit Pakistan after India, but according to the Soviet ambassador in Islamabad, it is still not certain that he will accept.

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
Japan: The major change in yesterday's cabinet reshuffle is the nomination of 68-year-old Takeo Fukuda to be finance minister. The former finance and foreign minister will bring widely recognized economic expertise and administrative competence to this key post at a time of economic difficulty. Fukuda has criticized aspects of Prime Minister Tanaka's economic growth policies and was once Tanaka's chief rival for power within the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party.

Sudan: Khartoum University reopened on 21 November after a closure of nearly three months caused by student disturbances in late August and early September. About 450 students have been dismissed or suspended from the university for their involvement in disorders that spread to the working class and professional groups. In the view of the US Embassy, most students appear eager to resume the academic year, but a number of hard-core dissidents, particularly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, are still trying to foment trouble.

*\*These items were prepared by CIA without consultations with the Departments of State and Defense.*

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